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Abstract 
X 
The economic turmoil over the past decade has accentuated the focus on corporate risk 
management and organizational adaptability under turbulent market conditions. However, 
there is little empirical evidence assessing whether promoted risk approaches are in fact 
associated with favourable corporate risk outcomes. Here we introduce the concept of 
dynamic capabilities as firm-specific adaptation under environmental turbulence that avoids 
extreme loss situations and provides stable business development. We test the relationship 
between effective dynamic capabilities and corporate risk outcomes in two large samples over 
two 10-year periods (1991-2000 and 2001-2010) representing distinctly different macro-
economic conditions. The analysis uncovers significant positive risk outcomes effects in both 
periods, which suggests that dynamic capabilities may serve as a conceptual foundation to 
better understand effective risk management practices.  
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Introduction 
A number of empirical studies have found significant increases in performance volatility and 
firm exits with periods of industry leadership becoming ever shorter (Baker & Kennedy, 
2002; Comin & Philippon, 2006; Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). These 
findings seem to reflect a more hostile and unforgiving competitive landscape, where it is 
difficult to build sustainable competitive advantage, and where the consequences of mal-
adaptation are increasingly severe. The challenge of competing under uncertainty has been at 
the core of strategy and organisation theory for a long time (Thompson, 1967), as the failure 
to respond to environmental change can hurt firm performance severely (Audia, Locke & 
Smith, 2000). These developments have promoted use of formal Enterprise Risk Management 
frameworks (e.g., COSO, FERMA and ISO)1 and promoting Chief Risk Officers to oversee 
them (Meulbroek, 2002; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Pagach & Warr, 2011). A number of 
studies have investigated use of derivatives in risk management and found that they reduce 
price sensitivity, where lower cash flow variability is associated with more favorable 
financing costs and higher stock valuations (Minton & Schrand, 1999; Smithson & Simkins, 
2005; Rountree, Weston & Allayannis, 2008).  
In strategy, risk management is captured by the concept of dynamic capabilities. In 
essence, these capabilities reflect how firms sense change, develop responses, and reorganize 
to match the changing requirements and stabilize performance (Andersen, Denrell & Bettis, 
2007; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). However, empirical studies on the risk-return effects of 
dynamic capabilities are far between, even though this is a fundamental concern among 
scholars (e.g., Teece, 2007; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Hence, there is a gap in our understanding 
                                                        
1 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has established a common 
internal control and risk management model; The Federation of European Risk Management Associations 
(FERMA) facilitates exchange of experiences among risk managers based on a generic risk management 
framework; The International Organization for Standards (ISO) issued a standard ISO 31.000 outlining general 
principles and processes for managing risk. 
   4  
of whether effective dynamic capabilities are in fact associated with better risk outcomes 
(Barreto, 2010; Protogerou, 2011). In this paper, we try to fill this gap through a 
comprehensive empirical study.   
In this study, we test if effective dynamic capabilities (EDC) improve the firm’s risk 
conditions measured by Altman’s Z-score, the Beta-coefficient, and downside risk. The study 
is based on two samples of US firms during the international growth period 1991-2000 (1,097 
firms) and the turbulent crisis period 2001-2010 (1,234 firms). We use two time periods to 
assess the robustness of results in two distinct macroeconomic environments. This is 
important as risk perceptions can vary over time and under different business conditions 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997).    
Background 
Strategic management tries to explain sustainable competitive advantage that leads to stable 
performance differentials among firms (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1994). During the 1970s, 
’80s and ’90s, industrial organisation scholars offered the view that firms’ resources are 
homogenous, i.e. evenly distributed among firms, and that firms achieve competitive 
advantage by picking an attractive industry and carving out a competitive position within it 
(Porter, 1980). The field later shifted attention to the firms’ stock of unique resources and 
firm-specific capabilities as the principal source of performance differentials (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Wan & Yiu, 1999). However, it does not explain how resources are updated and new ones 
created under changing competitive conditions, which is where dynamic capabilities come 
into the picture (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). 
The concept was originally defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” 
(Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997: 516). Effective dynamic capabilities help the firm identify and 
address external threats and thereby reduce potential risk for extreme adverse outcomes. 
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Adaptation to environmental changes can happen by sensing external threats, seizing possible 
responses, enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the business 
enterprise (Teece, 2007). The ability to sense, seize and reconfigure can reside in different 
parts of the firm as development and corporate restructuring (Danneels, 2002; Helfat, 1997; 
Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007), alliances (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 
2002; Kale & Singh, 2007), roll-outs (Winter, 2003) and knowledge integration (Henderson 
& Cockburn, 1994; Iansiti & Clark, 1994). Dynamic capabilities are seen as resource-based 
organisational processes (Barreto, 2010) that are tacit in nature (Easterby-Smith, Lyles, & 
Peteraf, 2009), path dependent (Zollo & Winter, 2002) and embedded within the firm 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Hence, they are typically developed internally rather than 
available in the market (Makadok, 2001). The diverse micro-elements that form the concept 
are difficult to measure. However, the embedded responses align the firm to on-going market 
changes, so it maintains earnings momentum as an aggregate expression of the firm’s ability 
to adapt to changing external requirements.  
Hypothesis Development 
The possession of dynamic capabilities may not necessarily equate superior risk outcomes 
since the relationship to competitive advantage is indeterminate (e.g., Helfat et al, 2007; Zollo 
& Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003). It will eventually require an empirical investigation to shed 
more light on both potential performance and risk relationships. There are more and less 
effective ways to execute dynamic capabilities and firms will create long-term competitive 
advantage by “using dynamic capabilities sooner, more astutely and more fortuitously than 
the competition” (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000: 1117). This means that firms most likely display 
varying levels of effectiveness in using its dynamic capabilities to achieve new resource 
configurations that are unique to the individual firm. Hence, firms with more effective 
dynamic capabilities relative to industry peers should produce more steady earnings flows 
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compared to competitors (Andersen, 2009). The relationship between dynamic capabilities 
and risk can be understood from a business development as well as an operational 
perspective. Hence, the firm may adapt its resources to exploit untapped market potential 
(Helfat & Winter, 2011) related to sensed changes in customer needs, technological 
advancements, or shifts in economic conditions. The firm can also gain operating advantages 
by minimizing the risk of shortage and excess capacity and inventories during upturns and 
downturns respectively (Miller & Chen, 2003).  
A firm with better responses and dynamic capabilities adapt to external threats and 
reduce the odds for lower-than-expected returns. Thus effective dynamic capabilities reduce 
earnings volatility and shield the firm from adverse risk outcomes. However, the 
environmental conditions under which dynamic capabilities are most important are disputed. 
The original definition implies that dynamic capabilities are mainly applicable in turbulent 
environments, such as IT, biotech and semiconductors (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Martin 
& Eisenhardt (2000) take a broader view applying dynamic capabilities to all firms, whether 
they operate in turbulent industries or not. They argue that, in more stable environments, 
dynamic capabilities apply more stable analytical processes in contrast to experiential and 
unpredictable processes in turbulent environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Hence, we 
will be able to ascertain both general as well as potential differential risk outcome effects 
across firms operating in different industry contexts and in sub-periods with different macro-
economic conditions. Given that the level and severity of disruptive events arguably are 
increasing and have been high also during the periodic crises in the 2000s, it might be 
expected that the risk effect of effective dynamic capabilities will prevail unabated in 
different time periods. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis. 
XXX 
   7  
H1: Firms with effective dynamic capabilities compared to industry peers will display 
favourable associations to measures of corporate risk outcomes 
We conducted an empirical study to test the hypothesis, which is outlined and 
discussed in the following.  
Methodology 
Sample selection 
Two samples were extracted from the Compustat North America database for the two periods 
1991-2000 and 2001-2010. We included both inactive and active companies to minimise 
survivorship bias, although it cannot be eliminated fully as only firms with data for all years 
within each of the periods are included. The sample is cross-sectional and includes firms in 
primary industries (SIC: 0-1999), manufacturing (SIC: 2000-3999), trade (SIC: 4000-4999), 
networks (SIC: 5000-5999) and various services (SIC: 7000-8999). All financial institutions 
(SIC 6000-6999) were excluded, however, as they are highly regulated and exhibit different 
risk-return characteristics compared to non-financial firms (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The 
distribution of firms by 1-digit SIC codes is shown in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1. 
Data cleaning was kept to a minimum, but we removed firms if they displayed 
negative values for equity, invested capital, revenue or SG&A expenditures in one or more 
years. Firms with revenues below 5 mio US $ in any given year were also excluded, as they 
are insignificant in size and may create extreme outliers. The effect of the different screens 
can be seen in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The R&D ratio in the 1991-2000 sample is 2.9% compared to 5.5% in 2001-2010 and is more 
volatile in the latter period. The average organisational slack ratio is 21.1% in the 1990s 
compared to 28.2% in the 2000s. Financial leverage fell slightly from 14.1% to 13.6% 
between the two periods likely reflecting more restricted access to debt financing. Some 
differences stem from distinct firm characteristics in the two samples with a higher share of 
young technology firms in the latter period. The general tendencies between the two periods 
remain, however, when investigating the descriptive statistics on a sub-sample of the 456 
firms represented in both time periods.  
Data from the two sub-periods were used to test the hypothesised effects and 
investigate whether macroeconomic environments affect the risk outcomes over time 
(Baucus, Golec, & Cooper, 1993; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986; Ruefli, 1990). Hence, we 
split the analysis across two sub-periods 1991-2000 and 2001-2010.  The 1990s represent a 
period of relative stable international expansion and economic progress with US GDP 
growing at an average inflation-adjusted rate of 3,4% p.a. with the S&P 500 increasing 457% 
percent to the end of 2000 (Figure 2). The volatility represented by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index2 (VIX), averaged 18.48 from 1991-2000 
influenced by the Mexican peso crisis (1995), Asian currency crisis (1997) and Russian debt 
default (1998) with a 50% devaluation of the Ruble. 
Insert Figure 2. 
The period 2001-2010 was a more volatile commercial environment including events 
like the burst of the dot-com bubble, the collapse of the World Trade Centre on 9/11 2001, 
and the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. US GDP grew with an average inflation-                                                        
2 VIX measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options and roughly measures the expected movement in the S&P 
index over the upcoming 30 days. Despite often being called a ‘fear index’, in fact it captures investor expectations about 
both upside and downside (cboe.com)  
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adjusted rate of 1.6% p.a. (US Bureau of Economic Analysis) and the S&P 500 fell 3.2% 
during the 2000s (Figure 2). The market instability was reflected in an average VIX of 22.04 
over the period.   
Dependent variables 
Risk outcomes – Several measures of risk outcomes have been advanced in prior studies. Here 
we chose three risk measures based on market as well as accounting based data: Altman’s Z-
score, the beta coefficient, and downside risk. 
Altman’s Z-score captures expected credit default risk, beta (β) is a proxy for market-
based systematic risk, and downside risk reflects the propensity for below par loss outcomes. 
Altman’s Z measures the distance from bankruptcy, which means, that a lower Z value 
signifies a higher likelihood of bankruptcy. Altman’s Z is defined as (1.2 × working capital 
divided by total assets) + (1.4 × retained earnings divided by total assets) + (3.3 × earnings 
before interest expense and taxes divided by total assets) + (0.6 × market value of equity 
divided by total liabilities) + (1.0 × sales divided by total assets) (Altman, 1983).  
Systematic risk is one of the most important risk metrics for publicly listed firms 
(McAlister, Srinivasan, & Kim, 2007). It reflects movements in equity prices caused by shifts 
in economy-wide factors including growth, inflation, interest and exchanges rates. Beta (ß) 
measures the systematic risk derived from portfolio theory, which asserts that investors can 
eliminate a portion of a stock’s risk by combining it into a portfolio of stocks with imperfectly 
correlated returns (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). The theory suggests that with a stock market 
in equilibrium the prices only reflect the stocks’ systematic risk driven by the extent to which 
stock returns change with overall market returns (Bodie, 2007). The complete stock market 
will have a ß of 1, whereas stocks whose return falls (rises) more than market return falls 
(rises) will have a ß that is larger than 1. Stock whose return generally fluctuates less than the 
market will have a ß that is less than 1 (Bodie, 2007). Thus, ß measures how sensitive a firm 
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is to overall market fluctuations. Following Beaver et al. (1970) and McAlister et al. (2007) 
we use monthly stock data to compute firm i’s systematic risk measure, ßi for a 10-year period 
by regression firm i’s returns on the indexed return of the full sample (Appendix A). 
Downside risk is an accounting-based risk measure using return on assets or analyst 
forecast of firm income as the basis (Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). 
Downside risk captures a firm’s propensity to produce performance outcomes below a certain 
level compared to the general industry. It reflects a view of risk as the potential for down-side 
losses. Miller & Leiblein (1996) show how this conception of risk is more closely aligned 
with how managers and financial analysts tend to define risk (Baird & Thomas, 1990; Mao, 
1970; March & Shapira, 1987; Miller and Leiblein, 1996; Miller and Reuer, 1996). We follow 
Miller & Leiblein (1996) and compute firm i’s downside risk (DRi) as the second-order root 
lower partial moment using the annual mean ROA (Appendix B). 
Explanatory variables 
Effective Dynamic Capabilities (EDC) are proxied by the standard deviation of the return on 
invested capital (St.d. (ROIC)) over a 10-year period with the measure interpreted inversely. 
This means that stronger dynamic capabilities are reflected in lower volatility in investment 
returns because the firm has been effective in adapting its resource base to the changing 
environmental conditions thereby guarding against major losses and securing more stable 
investment returns. So, the underlying intuition is that the better a firm is at adapting to its 
environment and avoiding excessive losses the better it is at maintaining a steady earnings 
flow over an extended period of time.   
Using a period of 10 years to calculate EDC captures effects of dynamic capabilities 
as a repeatable process used intentionally and persistently by firms in agreement with scholars 
in the field (e.g., Helfat, 2007; Zahra, 2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The ability to adapt 
resources and engage in strategic change, as captured in a relatively EDC measure cannot, 
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however, be fully ascribed to the presence of dynamic capabilities. This is because strategic 
changes also can be affected by incidents of luck (Barney, 1991), ad hoc interventions 
(Winter, 2003) and emergent non-deliberate processes (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). This 
obviously decreases the internal validity of the measure as a proxy for effective dynamic 
capabilities. However, the EDC measure is a good aggregate proxy for the concept that is 
consistent with the underlying theory even though it entails no detailed description of the 
underlying phenomenon. 
Control variables 
We included a number of control variables to ensure that the reported effects of EDC are true 
and not just stem from omitted explanatory variables. XXX 
Size – often correlates negatively with risk outcomes. Based on the logic that firm size 
reflects past success and the accumulation of resources and competencies will enable the firm 
to deflect risky situations. Fama & French (1993) found support for such a logic by showing 
that size reflects economic fundamentals with a higher risk premium ascribed to small firms. 
Firm size is measured by value of total assets included as the natural logarithm of total assets 
to correct for a positive skew in the data (e.g., Chiu & Liaw, 2009; George, 2005; Jermias, 
2008; O’Brien, 2003; Tong & Reuer, 2007).  
Advertising ratio – reflects a means of product differentiation and is expected to 
correlate negatively with risk outcomes, as advertising spending can serve as buffer to 
stabilise earnings and create intangible assets that insulate the firm from economy-wide 
downturns (e.g., Hurdle, 1974; McAlister et al., 2007). We measure the advertising ratio as 
advertising expenditures divided by sales (e.g., Hurdle, 1974; Erickson & Jacobson, 1992; 
Joshi & Hansens, 2004; Leone, 1995; McAlister et al., 2007).  
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R&D intensity – reflects the firm’s formal resource allocation that emphasizes new 
solutions to deal with changing conditions, which consequently might influence risk 
outcomes. It is measured as R&D expenditures committed to the development of new 
products and services divided by total revenue. This measure is widely used as proxy for a 
firm’s innovation investments (e.g., Ho et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2003; Kotabe, Srinivasan, & 
Aulakh, 2002; Lu & Beamish, 2004). In the case of missing data for R&D expenditures, they 
were assumed to be zero, in line with prior studies (e.g., Minton & Schrand, 1999).  
SG&A ratio – can be seen as a proxy for a firm’s level of organisational slack that may 
affect risk outcomes in two different ways. Either it can serve as an extra resource buffer 
under environmental pressures that facilitates experimentation and responsive solutions to 
threats (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005) or as a safety buffer that allows the firm to postpone 
necessary, but risky changes (Love & Nohria, 2005). The SG&A ratio is measured as selling, 
general, and administrative expenses divided by total sales (Tong & Reuer, 2007). 
Financial leverage – is an inverse measure of slack whereby firms operating with low 
financial leverage have a higher debt capacity for new responsive investment purposes, which 
might influence risk outcomes. Financial leverage is measured as the ratio of book value of 
debt to book value of total assets in line with previous studies (e.g., O’Brien, 2003; Vicente‐
Lorente, 2001).  
Asset growth – can be seen as a function of a firm’s ‘excess’ earnings opportunities, 
where the expected return on the capital acquisition exceeds the costs of capital (Beaver, 
Kettler, & Scholes, 1970). In a competitive economy ‘excess’ earnings opportunities will 
diminish as firms enter the industry (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2007), which can affect 
systematic risk (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; McAlister et al., 2007). XXX 
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Dividend payout – is viewed as a means of serving particular investor clienteles, 
reducing agency effects or signalling optimism about future value (Brealey et al., 2007). The 
effect on risk outcomes arises because dividend payout can be seen as a proxy for 
management’s perceived uncertainty of future earnings (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970). 
The empirical literature has found a negative relationship between dividend payout and 
systematic risk (e.g., Beaver, Kettler & Scholes, 1970; Ben-Zion & Shalit, 1975; Carter & 
Schmidt, 2008).   
Variable treatment 
There are systematic differences in performance across industries (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 
1997; Porter, 1979, 1980; Ruefli & Wiggins, 2003). To control for potentially confounding 
industry-specific effects, all measures were standardised by each firm-year observation across 
two-digit SIC codes (see Appendix C for a description of the method). Furthermore it is 
important and desirable to study how the variables influence risk outcomes over time. To do 
so, all the standardised dependent and independent variables, except beta and effective 
dynamic capabilities (EDC) were averaged over each 10-year period to eliminate spurious 




The correlation coefficients between the standardised variables provide a first sense for the 
direction and strength of the direct linear relationships between all variables used in the study. 
The three risk measures exhibit the expected consistency in both periods as beta and downside 
risk are positively and significantly correlated, while they both are negatively correlated with 
Altman’s Z (Table 2). An upward shift during the 2000s can be noted in the beta correlations 
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with both Altman’s Z and downside risk indicating a higher degree of systematic risk relative 
to accounting risk compared to the 1990s. EDC show the expected relationship with all three 
risk measures, as the measure is positively (negatively) correlated with beta and downside risk 
(Altman’s Z). EDC are negatively correlated with financial leverage, which is consistent with 
the previously discussed thesis: that more stable earnings make it possible for firms to 
increase their leverage. 
Insert Table 2. 
Regression results 
The hypothesis is tested with Altman’s Z-score, beta, and downside risk as dependent variable 
and EDC plus control variables as independent variables in regressions performed for each of 
the two sub-periods 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. XXX 
The regression models with Altman’s Z-score, beta, and downside risk as dependent 
variable all display statistically highly significant (p <’0.0001) coefficients consistent with the 
hypothesized risk relationships in both periods 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 respectively 
(Tables 3, 4, and 5). The regressions analyses display a positive (negative) and statistically 
significant relationship between EDC and both beta and downside risk (Altman’s Z-score), 
which yield support for hypothesis H1. This suggests that firms with stronger dynamic 
capabilities relative to their industry peers also tend to experience lower levels of credit 
default risk, have stocks valued in the market with lower levels of systematic risk, and have a 
much lower propensity to experience excessive losses. In short, they are better at responding 
to and fending against the broad-based fluctuations in the economy.  
Insert Table 3. 
Insert Table 4. 
         Insert Table 5. XXX 
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As expected, the analysis provides strong support for hypothesis H1, with significant 
parameter estimates with expected signs on EDC in both sub-periods. Adding EDC to the 
control models significantly increases their explanatory power, which attests to a strong 
association between dynamic capabilities and favourable risk outcomes.   
Assumptions and robustness 
All the regressions were analysed to understand the sensitivity to outliers. This was done by a 
process of removing influential outliers one by one, beginning with the observation with the 
highest Cook’s D value and ending with the last observation in the sample with a Cook’s D 
above 4/(n-k-1). Hence, all the reported regression results are based on the datasets with most 
outliers taken out, i.e., datasets only containing observations with Cook’s D below 4/(n-k-1). 
On average 50 outliers were removed from each model to reflect stable and generalizable 
results. We conducted tests to ensure that potential issues that may cause biases were 
identified and dealt with. We tested for normality of residuals, heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity.The distributional characteristics of regression residuals were tested by 
visual inspection of normal probability plots. The analyses reveal only slight and immaterial 
variations of residual normality in the regressions. Heteroscedasticity arises when the 
unobservable error is non-constant. This does not bias the OLS coefficients, but the computed 
standard errors will be biased downward and t- and F-tests invalidated. We tested for 
heteroscedasticity in the regression by applying the White test (White, 1980), where the 
squared residuals from the OLS regression were regressed on the dependent variables as well 
as their squares and cross-products (Wooldridge, 2009). We reported the regression results 
with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors to provide more conservative and 
appropriate statistical errors.  
Measurement errors in the explanatory variables can introduce both bias and 
inconsistency in the estimation of OLS coefficients. Measurement errors arise when an 
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imprecise measure of an economic phenomenon is used in a regression. For example, there 
can be potential issues with measurement error on reported R&D investments where the 
R&D/sales ratio is a less precise measure in companies with no or low R&D activities, such 
as, service-based companies (Hipp & Grupp, 2005; Kleinknecht, 1987). Similarly, we can 
challenge to what extent the aggregate measure of effective dynamic capabilities truly 
captures the complex nature of a firm’s deployment of dynamic capabilities. The literature 
typically suggests using an instrumental variable, if it can be found. Otherwise, it is assumed 
that the measurement error is uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variable, which 
ensures unbiased and consistent estimation of OLS coefficients.  
In the case of effective dynamic capabilities effectiveness, it is also reasonable to ask 
whether a firm can focus too much on continually transforming and adapting its resource and 
capability base? Ghemawat (1991) and Porter (1990) find that the most successful firms have 
a high degree of consistency in their strategy, suggesting that the firm can become too 
dynamic and adapt too much to its environment. Hence there seems to be a trade-off between 
consistency and adaptability (Selznick, 1957). In parallel, March (1991) underlined the 
importance of firms balancing exploring the future with exploiting current ways of doing 
business. We tested this by including second-order direct effects of EDC into the regressions 
and we do find support for the assertion of diminishing effects on the ability of dynamic 
capabilities to create lower-risk outcomes.  
We checked for robustness by running similar regressions in both time-periods using 
the same sub-sample of 456 firms that operated throughout all years in the entire 20-year 
period. This sub-sample consists of all the firms that are part of both full samples, hence 
representing relatively mature and stable companies. The central insight from the test is that 
sampling error does not drive reported results. All the analytical results for the two sub-
samples are comparable with only minor immaterial differences.  
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Discussion 
The relatively few studies assessing the relationship between earnings stability and risk 
outcomes are generally consistent with the hypothesis developed herein as they show indirect 
evidence that cash flow volatility increases the cost of capital (e.g., Beaver, Kettler, & 
Scholes, 1970; Minton & Schrand, 1999). 
Dynamic capabilities 
There has been a general shortage of empirical studies seeking to understand the effects of 
effectively creating and deploying dynamic capabilities. Part of the explanation for this is the 
challenge connected with developing appropriate measures of firm-specific dynamic 
capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al., 2009). This study makes a modest contribution towards 
filling this gap by suggesting the 10-year average of standard deviation of a firm’s return on 
invested capital as an inverse expression of how effective the firm is at building, maintaining 
and deploying dynamic capabilities. This provides an empirical basis for the argument that 
effective dynamic capabilities lead to superior risk outcomes. The underlying mechanism 
explaining this relationship is that effective dynamic capabilities enable the firm to 
continually deflect risk events that arise and exploit burgeoning opportunities in its markets as 
they change. Such enhanced adaptability ensures a steady earnings trajectory, which translates 
into lower risk. The findings support that this relationship holds for several accounting and 
market-based risk measures.  
The results are also noteworthy with regard to the theoretical discussion about the 
environmental conditions under which dynamic capabilities are most effective. By studying 
two adjacent time periods with markedly different economic environments, the results 
generally suggest that effective dynamic capabilities persistently create favourable risk 
outcomes under different conditions of economic turbulence. This makes sense as effective 
dynamic capabilities enable firms to adapt under volatile environmental conditions. So far, the 
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focus of dynamic capabilities has primarily been on the role in the industry environment (e.g., 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; D. Teece et al., 1997). These results therefore invite dynamic 
capabilities scholars to broaden the focus to include studies of broader industry contexts and 
in different macroeconomic environments.   
Risk management 
Building on the resource-based view, the dynamic capabilities literature has been mostly 
occupied with the construct as a means of creating excess returns. Less attention has been 
directed at how developing and deploying dynamic capabilities can help the firm shape a 
more attractive risk profile. Thereby this study can both suggest a theoretical explanation of 
previous empirical findings within the finance and strategic management literatures as well as 
provide empirical evidence that advances the study of risk management.  
Within strategic management, the results presented here corroborate with Miller & 
Leiblein (1996), finding a positive association between earnings variability and downside 
risk. Similarly, the results align with the finance literature, where Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes 
(1970) find a negative relationship between earnings variability and systematic risk. In 
parallel, Minton & Schrand (1999) find a positive relationship between cash flow volatility 
and the cost of debt and equity. The above scholars pay less attention to the dynamics that 
shape such lower earning variability. It thus makes sense to propose that it is by efficiently 
developing and deploying a set of dynamic capabilities that the firm is able to achieve a stable 
flow of earnings, resulting in lower, and thus more attractive, risk outcomes.   
The risk management literature has broadened its traditional focus on hazards, 
economic risks and operational breakdowns to include strategic risks stemming from changes 
in consumer preferences, competitor strategies or regulation (Miller, 1998). As such strategic 
risks tend to be both highly firm-specific as well as hard to measure and foresee, several 
scholars (e.g. Andersen, 2009; Henriksen & Uhlenfeldt, 2006; Miller, Kurunmäki, & 
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O’Leary, 2008; Power, 2007) deem centralised risk management systems and standardised 
risk-transfer techniques less useful in dealing with such exposures. In this regard, Andersen 
(2008, 2009) highlights the role of organisational responsiveness as a means of managing 
(strategic) risks and further empirically shows that dampened earnings volatility as a result of 
the firm using its responsiveness to better manage exogenous risk factors strengthens firm 
performance (Andersen, Denrell & Bettis, 2007). The results herein build on these findings to 
suggest that not only do stronger firm responsiveness and adaptability strengthen 
performance; it also directly drives lower credit default, downside and systematic risk 
outcomes. This means that effective dynamic capabilities act both as a means of dealing with 
industry-specific strategic risks, which could lead to severe underperformance, and as a way 
of insulating firms from changes in the stock market and the broader economy.  
Limitations 
Aggregate constructs – the study measures the risk effect of effectively developing and 
deploying dynamic capabilities at an aggregated level. The use of rough proxies limits ability 
to describe the underlying real world phenomena and relationships that we are trying to 
portrait and understand. Hence, it would be very interesting and useful to further investigate 
the organisational mechanisms governing the firm-specific dynamic capabilities and how they 
help the firm adapt under different environmental circumstances. This requires deep 
qualitative analyses of firms that represent the positive risk outcomes effects, which is beyond 
the scope of the current study. Yet, we observe significant effects of dynamic capabilities 
during the 1990s and the 2000s and gaining more insights about these phenomena requires 
access to more granular and firm-specific data than is available in the existing accounting 
data. Penrose (1959) underlined the difficulty in measuring routines and processes that are 
likely to be idiosyncratic to firms. It might therefore make sense to conduct complementary 
survey-based studies or case-study analyses to understand the above questions at the industry 
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and/or firm level as shown by, e.g., Galunic and Eisenhardt (2001), Lampel and Shamsie 
(2003), Pablo et al. (2007), and Rosenbloom (2000). 
We have not specifically addressed the issues pertaining to endogeneity problems in 
this study even though it is likely that there are potential reverse causality issues playing out. 
It could be argued, for instance, that performance creates slack resources (e.g., Penrose, 
1959), which can then affect performance both directly and indirectly by supporting the 
effectiveness of dynamic capabilities. However, performance is reflected in higher earnings 
and unless a firm deliberately increase its dividends or debt, such higher profits will be 
retained and thereby add to shareholder equity, which influences the capital structure directly 
(Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Given that capital structure is controlled for in the regressions, 
this minimizes the risk of reverse causality. Similarly, inverse causality may take place when 
we use investment return variability as a measure of dynamic capabilities. Miller & Bromiley 
(1990) found that firm performance influences subsequent earnings variability differently 
across high- and low-performing firms. They explain this with prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) arguing that high (low) performers will tend to 
be more (less) risk averse, subsequently leading to less (more) variable performance. Two 
ways of circumventing such potential simultaneous causality issues would be to use panel 
data and time lags or a simultaneous equations model for estimation, such as two-stage least 
squares (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Conclusion 
This study finds general support for a key hypothesis, namely that when firms use their 
dynamic capabilities in an effective way to avoid threats and manage opportunities in its 
environment, it will lead to lower market- and accounting based risk outcomes. This indicates 
that effective dynamic capabilities are particularly important for shaping attractive risk 
outcomes when the overall economy is turbulent and volatile. The reported results invite 
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further scholarly studies into the art of quantifying the unruly concept of dynamic capabilities 
and the mechanisms that lead to a more favorable risk profile. The study underscores that 
dynamic capabilities play a central role in risk management processes that facilitate corporate 
adaption under turbulent economic conditions.  
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Figure 1.     Distribution of Firms Across One-digit SIC-code Industries 
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Table 1.     Description of the Sampled Firm Data  
 
Period 1991-2000 2001-2010 
Gross sample (all non-financial companies in 
Compustat in the given period) 
17,112 15,099 
# firms with incomplete accounting data or 
negative equity, SG&A or revenue 
–11,480 –10,462 
# firms with less than 10 years of data –3,648 –2,547 
# firms with incomplete stock market data –685 –489 
# firms in industry with two or less firms –73 –64 
# firms with total assets or revenue less than 
5m US $ 
–129 –303 
Final sample 1,097 1,234 
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+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01;  n=1,097                  
 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  n=1,234
1991-2000 Mean   SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1  Altman’s Z 4.501 2.602                     
2  Beta 0.956 0.534  –  0.012                   
3  Downside risk 0.049 0.063  –  0.228**  0.296**                 
4  EDC 0.105 0.065  –  0.047  0.238**  0.591**               
5  Size 5.053 1.689  –  0.076*  –  0.203**  –  0.312**  –  0.243**             
6  Asset growth 0.120 0.174  0.239**  0.155**  –  0.089**  0.042  0.085**           
7  Dividend payout 0.303 1.768  –  0.033  –  0.171**  –  0.094**  –  0.087**  0.075*  –  0.090**         
8  Advertising ratio 0.009 0.022  0.062*  0.010  0.051+  0.042  –  0.027  0.002  0.010       
9  R&D investment 0.029 0.046  0.124**  0.161**  0.182**  0.104**  0.013  0.084**  –  0.034  0.056+     
10  Organiz. slack 0.211 0.124  0.212**  0.109**  0.128**  0.084**  –  0.143**  0.055+  –  0.037  0.185**  0.314**   
11  Financial leverage 0.141 0.109  –  0.539**  0.038  0.061*  –  0.054+  0.209**  0.052+  0.016  –  0.092**  –  0.138**  –  0.227** 
2001-2010 Mean   SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1  Altman’s Z 4.818 4.735                     
2  Beta 1.033 0.515  –  0.169**                   
3  Downside risk 0.081 0.143  –  0.344**  0.365**                 
4  EDC 0.177 0.744  –  0.131**  0.218**  0.301**               
5  Size 6.317 2.007  0.002  –  0.027  –  0.312**  –  0.127**             
6  Asset growth 0.091 0.115  0.231**  –  0.048+  –  0.169**  –  0.060*  0.219**           
7  Dividend payout 0.160 1.437  –  0.284**  –  0.081**  –  0.128**  –  0.038  0.105**  0.036         
8  Advertising ratio 0.010 0.024  0.305**  0.006  0.019  0.054*  0.016  0.008  –  0.668**       
9  R&D investment 0.055 0.106  –  0.088**  0.113**  0.193**  0.083**  –  0.066*  –  0.063*  –  0.021  –  0.015     
10  Organiz. slack 0.282 0.206  0.048+  0.175**  0.332**  0.124**  –  0.200**  –  0.083**  –  0.267**  0.290**  0.227**   
11  Financial leverage 0.136 0.125  –  0.462**  0.040  –  0.015  –  0.057*  0.260**  –  0.030  0.079**  –  0.061*  –  0.053+  –  0.158** 
29 
T
able 2.  D
escriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
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Table 3.     Regressions results with Altman’s Z-score as dependent variable 
Year   1991-2000       2001- 2010  
            
              
Intercept     –   0.019  –   0.009         –   0.080***  –   0.059** 
Size       0.004  –   0.030      –   0.011  –   0.027 
Asset growth       0.372***  0.396***       0.393***  0.335*** 
Dividend payout       0.061*  0.052*      0.203***  0.162*** 
Advertising ratio    0.022  0.029      0.055***  0.059** 
R&D investment    0.052+  0.080**     –   0.015***  –   0.012*** 
Organisational slack    0.009  0.017     –   0.034  –   0.018 
Financial leverage    –  0.558***  –   0.558***     –   0.467***  –   0.469*** 
                  
EDC          –   0.080***        –   0068*** 
              
Multiple R2    0.398  0.427     0.290  0.340 
Adjusted R2    0.394  0.422     0.286  0.335 
F-significance    0.000  0.000     0.000  0.000 
# of observations    1046  1046     1194  1194 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.     Regression results with beta as dependent variable  
Year   1991-2000       2001-2010   
            
              
Intercept        0.053+   0.035         0.136***  0.109*** 
Size      –   0.243***  –   0.181***      0.031  0.056+ 
Asset growth      0.375***  0.405***       –   0.080  –   0.078 
Dividend payout      –   0.146***  –   0.135***      –   0.314***  –   0.289*** 
Advertising ratio    0.008  –   0.024      –   0.028  –   0.023 
R&D investment    0.346***  0.297***     0.148**  0.145** 
Organisational slack    –   0.035  –   0.020     0.063+  0.026 
Financial leverage    0.195***  0.183***     0.026  0.045 
                  
EDC          0.150***        0.122*** 
              
Multiple R2    0.203  0.241     0.086  0.134 
Adjusted R2    0.198  0.235     0.080  0.128 
F-significance    0.000  0.000     0.000  0.000 
# of observations    1052  1052     1188  1188 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
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Table 5.     Regression results with downside risk as dependent variable  
Year   1991-2000       2001- 2010   
            
              
Intercept     –   0.092***  –   0.117***         –   0.136***  –   0.178*** 
Size      –   0.294***  –   0.152***      –   0.182***  –   0.120*** 
Asset growth      –   0.242***  –   0.151***       –   0.310***  –   0.198*** 
Dividend payout      –   0.100*  –   0.059**      –   0.222***  –   0.151*** 
Advertising ratio    0.031  –   0.031+      –   0.027*  –   0.038*** 
R&D investment    0.236***  0.093***     0.053***  –   0.001 
Organisational slack    –   0.026     0.033      0.147***  0.112*** 
Financial leverage    0.223***  0.225***     0.076***  0.082*** 
                  
EDC          0.458***        0.248*** 
              
Multiple R2    0.193  0.595     0.253  0.502 
Adjusted R2    0.187  0.592     0.248  0.498 
F-significance    0.000  0.000     0.000  0.000 
# of observations    1040  1040     1179  1179 
+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Appendix A: Methodology for calculation beta 
Beta for firm i is found using monthly stock data to compute the following regression: 
Ri,t = αi + βiRsample,t + εi,t  ; t = first month, … , last month 
Ri,t  = Ln(Dit + Pit)/P′it – 1 and Rsample,t = Ln(Lt/Lt– 1), where Ri,t is the ex post rate of return 
for stock i during month t; Rsample,t is an index of the ex post return for all the firms in the 
sample during month t (i.e., a proxy for the market return3). αi is the intercept of the fitted line 
of Ri,t using Rsample,t; Di,t is the cash dividend payable on common stock i in month t; Pi,t is the 
closing price of common stock i at the end of month t; P′i,t – 1 is the closing price at the end of 
month t – 1 adjusted for capital changes (e.g., stock splits, stock dividends); and Lt and Lt-1 
are composite index returns for the full sample at months t and t-1 respectively, adjusted for 
dividends and all capital charges. The slope of the regression equation βi (hat) is the empirical 
estimate of systematic risk βi of firm i.  
 
Appendix B: Methodology for calculation downside risk 
Downside risk for firm i (DRi) is computed as the second-order root lower partial moment 
using the annual mean ROA among firm i’s two-digit SIC industry peers as target level 
(ROAindustry). It takes a value different from zero in those years where the firm performs 
below the industry target level: 
DRi = [0.1∑(ROAindustry,t - ROAt)2]0.5 ; t = year 1, .. , year 10 in sample,  
when ROAt < ROAindustry,t, otherwise 0 
 
Appendix C: Standardization methodology and discussion 
The standardization calculation will look like this for a given sample firm’s R&D ratio in a 
given year:      
    
A standardised variable is created by deducting the industry mean for the given variable and 
year from the un-standardized variable, and dividing by the industry standard deviation for the 
given variable and year. This approach is congruent with previous studies (e.g., Ho et al., 
2006; McGrath & Nerkar, 2003; O’Brien, 2003).  
                                                        
3 Usually the return of an official index, e.g., S&P 500 or all companies in the New York Stock Exchange is used as a proxy 
for the market return. We, however, evaluate it to be equally sound to use my full sample of 1000+ firms, as it arguably has 
an at least as wide coverage of different firms and industries as, e.g., the S&P 500 
 
R & DStadardized ,t =
R& Dt −R& D industry,t
σ industry,t
